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The dispute between the moral and the political conceptions of human rights – 
the main theme of this collection of essays – has had all the ingredients of a 
healthy academic debate. First and foremost, the dispute has developed 
based on a set of shared premises. One premise is that, for a majority of 
participants in the debate, the notion of human rights is not reducible to 
neighboring categories of thought, such as ‘rights’, ‘justice’ or ‘legitimacy’. 
Another is that the notion has not been properly and/or sufficiently theorized 
despite its exponential use in (international) law and politics. As we shall see, 
how to fill this vacuum is the source of deep disagreement and some precisely 
think that the whole enterprise, while valuable, is premature – that ‘there is not 
enough discipline underpinning the use of the term “human rights” to make it a 
useful analytical tool’.2 
 
Another ingredient is that the dispute has had ramifications in tangential 
disciplines, in particular law and history. Contributors from these fields have 
not only offered their  ‘perspective’ on the notion and practice of human rights 
– e.g. through intellectual or global history. They also have to come to bear on 
the terms of dispute – see in particular the debate between Samuel Moyn and 
Seyla Benhabib in Qui Parle? 3 , a rare and admirable encounter. The 
exchange goes both ways; Allen Buchanan’s recent attempt to build a 
normative theory of international human rights law specifically is the reverse 
indication4 that normative theorists aim to appropriate another discipline to 
satisfy a project of their own – a form of extra-disciplinarity. What explains that 
the dispute is so porous to other disciplines – in contrast to other debates in 
normative theory – is a question worth exploring.  
 
In addition, the debate has given rise to a multitude of publications and events 
over the last ten years or so – articles, monographs, special issues and 
symposia, as well as another anthology recently published 5  – that have 
consistently informed and re-framed the terms of the dispute without sliding 
towards orthodoxy. A special issue of Ethics in 20106 on James Griffin’s On 
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Human Rights7 – a prototypical example of the moral conception – can be 
seen as setting the terms of the initial debate. One will notice the some 
prominent contributors to that issue are also part of the collection reviewed 
here, which can provide a good measure of the dispute’s trajectory until today. 
 
This collection of essays – followed by short responses – hence offers an 
excellent and timely occasion to measure the dispute’s state of health. The 
three variables outlined above – the dispute’s philosophical premises, its main 
variations and developments and its inter-disciplinary dimension(s) – will 
guide this review. This exercise is inevitably selective and regrettably I shall 
not refer to all the contributions of the collection. Rather, I shall concentrate on 
the contributions (in Part I and II) that directly come to grips with the core 
dispute, forming a thread throughout the collection. This is problematic in 
itself. Some of these authors have developed a wider and richer account of 
human rights than what a review of their contribution here allows saying. The 
work of Allen Buchanan 8 , Samantha Besson 9 , James Nickel 10  or John 
Tasioulas 11  on the foundations of human rights indeed pre-dates the 
emergence of the moral/political dispute. Similarly, the collection contains 
contributions from some of the most prominent figures in the broader fields of 
moral, political and legal theory today (e.g. Rainer Forst, Joseph Raz, Jeremy 
Waldron) whose prior and independent work has implications for thinking 
about human rights. In both cases, it is painful to refer to these contributions 
without a broader context. The collection, it should be repeated, by far does 
not only address the dispute. Subsequent sections (Part III and IV) expand on 
connected methodological and substantive issues such as feasibility, power, 
humanitarian action, self-determination and immigration. Another review is 
required to shed light on these parameters.  
 
The binarism opposing ‘moral’ and the ‘political’ built into the title on its own 
suggests that the dispute is both enduring and philosophically profound. 
Samuel Moyn in his chapter ‘Human Rights in Heaven’ provides an excellent 
overview of the dispute’s binaristic premises. He traces the ‘political’ 
conception back to the work of John Rawls’ The Law of Peoples12, and to the 
functionalism of human rights in the Rawlsian reconstruction of the 
international system. On Rawls’ view, Moyn explains, human rights define ‘a 
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code of conduct that all states must satisfy in order to avoid being subject to 
justified foreign intervention’.13 In other words, unlike constitutional rights the 
function of human rights is not conceivable – for the purposes of both 
description and normative theory – outside the deep structure of the 
international system shaped by the prerogative of equal state sovereignty. 
This functionalism is also salient in Rawls’ closest correspondent in the 
dispute (although absent from the collection), Charles Beitz’ The Idea of 
Human Rights14, for whom ‘we understand the concept of human rights by 
asking for what kinds of reasons, in what kinds of circumstances, human 
rights claims may be understood to give reasons’.15 
 
And this is precisely where the dispute arises: to make the very existence and 
content of human rights contingent upon their sovereignty-disabling role (or 
their capacity to general ‘international concern’ 16  in Beitz’ more recent 
account) conflicts with the explicit, intuitive and philosophically relevant 
meaning of human rights, namely that they are ‘inherent to the human 
condition’. The political conception is an affront to the idea that the existence 
and normative force of human rights is independent from recognition in law 
and politics. How does one move from this ‘inherence’ concept to a proper 
conception? That should be, the moral camp summons, the prior and 
distinctive question for human rights theorists to answer before drawing any 
justified implication in the practical world – be it interpersonal, political or 
international.  
 
Moyn’s brief genealogy already helps identify a few lasting traits of the 
dispute. One aspect is empirical to the extent that functionalism depends on 
variables that cannot but be empirically grasped. It is also methodological – 
for the tenants of the moral conception – as functionalism ‘misses precisely 
the philosopher’s proper goal of proffering a theory of normative principles at 
first separate from its implications for the international order’.17 Moyn himself 
suggests that while Rawls’ empirical premises might simply be wrong, ‘there 
is not too much functionalism in the current philosophy of human rights; there 
is far too little’.18 Moyn refers to the “realities of global human rights culture”19 
as the correct object of normative reconstruction. Ultimately, however, Moyn 
does not provide such a reconstructive account; his contribution is only 
deconstructive – ‘to point out the significance of the debate itself”20 – and 
programmatic – ‘a normative heaven is not the place to keep our utopias’.21 
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In his short response to Moyn, John Tasioulas – the defendant of a pluralistic 
yet fully moral conception – directly addresses Moyn’s concern. Tasioulas’ 
solution – developed throughout several articles22 and a long expected book – 
is to construct a ‘threshold that enables us to pass from universal human 
interests to duties generated by those interests that are owed to all human 
beings’.23 A concrete example would be the right to an adequate standard of 
living, which, as Tasioulas explains, is available only in the ‘context of 
modernity’.24 Tasioulas’ response helps refine one parameter of the dispute, 
namely how the moral camp understands its own feasibility and applicability 
criteria. Note that ‘fidelity to practice’ is something that the moral camp – 
James Griffin in particular – had already and seriously considered as a 
necessary requirement of a satisfactory theory.25 The logical order still places 
the specification of the concept – by ordinary moral reasoning – first.   
 
The political camp however, still ardently disputes this logical order for 
reasons that are further clarified the exchange between Jeremy Waldron and 
Joseph Raz. Waldron articulates a functional ‘Armed Intervention View’ (found 
in slightly dissimilar versions in both Rawls and Raz26) according to which the 
prototypical function of human rights is for a state (or an international 
organization) to remedy, punish for or prevent violations in another state. This 
correlatively implies that respect for human rights guarantees non-intervention 
and a legitimate place in the international system. Waldron notably points to 
the multiple factors that count toward such an intervention, which ‘makes their 
theory look ad hoc, if it turns out not only that many of the rights we thought 
were human rights are not human rights on this account, but also that right-
based grounds for humanitarian intervention are usually entangled with other 
grounds’. 27 Using a different angle of counter-attack, Raz in his response 
emphasizes the ‘place of rights in the normative domain’28, which cannot but 
be historically and functionally sensitive. Echoing another defender of the 
political camp, Charles Beitz, Raz admits that the moral conception could in 
principle fit his account of rights but contends that the ‘historical dependence 
of rights implies that most of the rights that are taken to be human rights are 
not of that kind’.29 In other words, Raz seems to make an empirical point, not 
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a conceptual one. He does not rebut the moral significance of the practice of 
human rights and the applicability of the moral conception, only its validity. 
 
That exchange might leave the reader perplexed. What, then, makes the 
dispute properly philosophical if the disagreement is ultimately empirical? In 
‘Assigning Functions to Human Rights: Methodological Issues in Human 
Rights Theory’ James Nickel successfully unpacks another apparent binarism. 
He shows with that functionalism in fact spreads across the moral and the 
political conceptions. What applies to functional claims in general – that they 
‘often presuppose or impose temporal restrictions, limit spheres of use, and 
adopt distinctive points of view’ 30  – applies to human rights theory in 
particular. What makes the moral and the political accounts both functional is 
that it is “directing the behavior of persons and institutions (…)’. 31  What 
distinguishes them is their focus; ‘the spheres in which human rights operate, 
the level of abstraction at which a theorist proceeds, and special points of 
view’.32 Rawls, Beitz and Raz focus on international politics, while Tasioulas 
and Griffin extend and/or prioritize their inquiry at the inter-personal level. 
Nickel hence suggests that ‘self-consciousness and explicit debates about 
disciplinary orientations and methods would be helpful’.33 In his response to 
Nickel, Etinson helpfully notes that a theory of human rights still ‘must achieve 
a degree of fit with the ordinary concept of human rights – with the ordinary 
meaning of the term’34 if it aims to be recognizable as a theory of human 
rights at all. Once that criterion is met, “being faithful to practice” can take 
different routes; substantive, when “a theory validates the same (or roughly) 
the same set of human rights as the practice does” or interpretative ‘when a 
theory captures the normative considerations that underlie or justify the 
various rights proclaimed in practice’.35  
 
The same quest for balance between fidelity to the concept of human rights 
and fidelity to the practice animates the exchange between Andrea 
Sangiovanni and Rainer Forst. Among Sangiovanni’s four desiderata for a 
satisfactory theory, one is that ‘human rights theories must demarcate and 
explain the sense in which human rights are proper subset of the set of all 
moral rights simpliciter; if they are unable to do so, then talk of human rights is 
redundant; one might just as well talk about moral rights’.36 Another is that 
‘human rights theories must be sufficiently faithful to the human rights culture 
that has emerged since 1945 and that is captured in the main human rights 
instruments (…)’. 37  This practice might very well be multifaceted; yet 
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Sangiovanni believes in the possibility of a ‘single project’ delineated by the 
kind of universal concern required by the subset desideratum. While sharing 
the aims of Sangiovanni, Forst in his response expresses doubts about 
delivery. The desideratum of a sub-set of moral rights may simply be too 
indeterminate – ‘some reference to a thicker moral language like that of 
dignity or normative status might be unavoidable’.38 Similarly, Forst does not 
believe that a single project transcends the variety of practices; ‘a very broad 
understanding’ of human rights does not suffice; rather, what is needed is a 
conception that no one can reasonably reject’39 – echoing his own approach 
to human rights based on ‘the right to justification’.40  
 
It is worth pausing here to examine whether any philosophical progress has 
been made. To the extent that at least two ‘false binarisms’ were revealed – 
around empiricism and functionalism – one is tempted to say ‘yes’. Unraveling 
apparent distinctions and oppositions, and gaining further clarity on what 
disagreement exactly concerns, are usually praised outputs in analytic 
philosophy. These achievements should be applauded and the collection’s 
dialogic structure is certainly helpful. Yet, a basic consensus on a 
methodological road map seems inextricably missing. Two philosophical 
aspirations take the very project of a human rights theory in opposite 
directions, which prevents methodological unity; fidelity to the concept and 
fidelity to the practice – and, more precisely, the degrees of thickness 
(concept) and specificity (practice) that should be adopted in constructing the 
theory. Furthermore, how these two desiderata should be combined implies a 
further margin of maneuver. As Etinson rightly notes, it is one thing that a 
theory happens to ‘match’ the practice (as to what rights are human rights); it 
is another that a theory consists of an immanent interpretation and justification 
of that same practice. The challenge of combining the two fidelities applies to 
both.  
 
From that standpoint, the collection reveals that what seemed like a deep 
philosophical opposition has transformed into a programmatic discussion 
around broad substantive and methodological pre-requisites – but without any 
clear road-map on how to actually build an appropriately designed theory. 
Now, taking into account this state of affairs, I believe that the next logical 
step – following Nickel’s call for disciplinary awareness – would require that 
human rights theorists across the spectrum more rigorously identify, 
distinguish and reconstruct the human rights practice(s) they deem relevant to 
their pre-determined theoretical endeavors. This directly speaks to the inter-
disciplinary dimension of the dispute. It is quite surprising that the collection 
displays such a wide consensus on the requirement of (some form of) 
practice-responsiveness without a subsequent and structured discussion on 
how to even select – an eventually reconstruct – relevant practices.  
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Human rights practice qua normative practice is reason-based. Human rights 
give situated agents (some) reasons to take or not to take action(s). If 
anything, practice-responsiveness requires objectifying these reasons and 
establish whether there is a recognizable practice at all; whether there is a 
‘single project’ – to use Sangiovanni’s term – that sufficiently represents 
practice; and whether the concept of human rights (concept-fidelity) can be 
reconciled with that project. In my view, these intermediate tasks are strictly 
required not only because the practice-type may widely vary (e.g. the 
Amnesty International activist’s views or the reasoning of a supranational 
human rights court), but also because their practice’s degrees of authority and 
compliance are constantly evolving. For that portion of the investigation, the 
human rights theory project requires mastering neighboring (be they social-
scientific or legal) disciplines and their respective methodologies. Objectifying 
reasons or patterns is not an intuitive or an analytic process; it is first and 
foremost empirical. Otherwise put, I worry that professional human rights 
theorists have proposed far too many variations of the same research 
program (‘practice-responsiveness’) without actually carrying out their 
investigation due to disciplinary fault-lines. Raz diagnosed that ‘there is not 
enough discipline underpinning the use of the term “human rights” to make it a 
useful analytical tool’.41 I am wondering whether in fact there is not enough 
self-discipline.  
 
The embryonic stage of this research program is seen, I believe, in how the 
collection addresses international human rights law, which is widely assumed 
to constitute a relevant – perhaps the most developed – practice-type. Allen 
Buchanan and Gopal Sreenivasan’s contribution42 aims at transitioning from 
the initial, rather abstract debate surveyed above to what they call the 
‘international human rights legal system’ specifically. Yet, the transition is 
abrupt. Surely, the project of distinguishing moral human rights and legal 
human rights as independent objects of justification is cogent. Yet, is their 
‘system’ sufficiently practice-sensitive? And how are we to assess this 
question without a prior description – as impartial observers – of that 
‘systemic’ practice? This explanatory gap prevents, in my view, from even 
situating Buchanan and Sreenivasan’s contribution in any legally (or 
practically) recognizable context. Surprisingly, the authors readily dismiss 
regional and constitutional practices of human rights without much justification 
– when regional systems are, by far, the most compliance generating. This 
dismissal is also found, it should be noted, in Beitz’ ‘global human rights 
practice’.43 Further, it is unclear when and why an international human rights 
treaty becomes a ‘system’.44 Buchanan and Sreenivasan take ‘recognition by 
a valid international treaty that describes itself as a human rights treaty (such 
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273. 
as the ICCPR or the ICESCR) as sufficient to qualify a right an international 
legal human right’.45 But how a treaty – which, on its own, can remain totally 
inert – generates a ‘system’ is left unexplained. Buchanan and Sreenivasan 
are fully “aware of the myriad specific features of rights that together define 
the character of a system of rights”46 but that remains an awareness of the 
questions, not of their answers – for instance, how much authority the 
international system should have vis-à-vis the domestic legal system, or who 
bears the primary legal duties correlative to rights. These questions have 
answers – even provisional and indeterminate.  
 
Interestingly, the subsequent contributions of Mattias Kumm47 and Andreas 
Follesdal48 contain some of these answers. Both contributions build upon prior 
and seminal research (e.g. Follesdal on subsidiarity 49 , Kumm on 
proportionality50) and each surely deserves a review of its own. Yet, for the 
purpose of the collection, these contributions have the opposite – but still 
undesirable – effect to Buchanan and Srenivasan’s contribution in severely 
circumscribing the context of investigation. Their context is not only 
constitutional and/or regional (ECtHR/CJEU); Kumm and Follesdal also 
immerse the reader in a particular judicial context – the proportionality test for 
Kumm, the margin of appreciation for Follesdal – that make their answers 
irremediably contingent. Follesdal posits that, in examining the level of 
authority of the European Court of Human Rights to determine cases in which 
human rights may be limited (one of Buchanan and Sreenivasan’s questions), 
granting states a margin of appreciation to the latter ones is ‘appropriate in 
case where the ECtHR recognizes that there is reasonable disagreement 
about whether the state violates the ECHR (…)’.51 In these cases, the Court’s 
authority should be limited to reviewing the proportionality of the interference 
and that is ‘to ensure that the domestic decision procedures have indeed 
been conducive to deliberative processes’52; resistant to this filter are the 
rights that are necessary to democratic deliberation itself. However 
illuminating, his analytical frame can hardly be extended beyond Strasbourg’s 
jurisdiction. Indeed, the margin of appreciation – or any other form of 
deferential device – is notoriously absent from the jurisprudence of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, for instance. And the reader has not yet 
                                                        
45 Ibid., 213.  
46 Ibid., 221. 
47 Mattias Kumm, ‘The Turn to Justification: On the Structure and Domain of 
Human Rights Practice’.  
48 Andreas Follesdal, ‘Appreciating the Margin of Appreciation’. 
49 See in particular Andreas Follesdal, “Survey Article: Subsidiarity,” Journal 
of Political Philosophy 6, no. 2 (1998): 190–218. See also Andreas Follesdal, 
“Subsidiarity and International Human-Rights Courts: Respecting Self-
Governance and Protecting Human Rights—Or Neither?,” Law and 
Contemporary Problems 79, no. 2 (June 20, 2016): 147–63 
50 See for instance Mattias Kumm, “The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the 
Right to Justification: The Point of Rights-Based Proportionality Review,” Law 
& Ethics of Human Rights 4, no. 2 (2010): 142–175. 
51 Andreas Follesdal, ‘Appreciating the Margin of Appreciation’, 289.  
52 Ibid. 
seen a trace of the quasi-judicial practice of UN Treaty Bodies or the UN 
Human Rights Committee – and that applies to the entire collection.  
 
True, Kumm’s contribution addresses the concept-fidelity desideratum 
directly, but to rapidly denounce it: ‘the problem is that actual human rights 
practice generally does not fit very well with the any limited domain 
conception. Human rights claims do not, in legal practice, occupy a narrow 
domain limited to things fundamental’.53 Spanning the reasoning of European 
courts, both national and supranational, Kumm points to the distinctive 
method of adjudication – the three-ponged proportionality test (assessing the 
legitimate aim of the state interference, its necessity, and whether a least 
restrictive means was available) – as distinctive of the practice of (human) 
rights; ‘they are inextricably connected to the idea of politics as the process of 
establishing justice among free and equals under conditions of reasonable 
disagreement.54 The more basic notion arbitrating right-claims for Kumm is 
‘reasonableness’ (he also refers to the Rawlsian notion of ‘public reason’ and 
in other works to Forst’s ‘right to justification’, which does not satisfy the 
concept-fidelity desideratum either), which expresses a blend of liberal and 
democratic morality with a pinch of the rule of law. Clearly, the limited domain 
flies in the face of that human rights practice. If anything, human rights have 
instilled a ‘culture of justification’55 on the part of public authorities.  
 
Kumm’s and Follesdal’s insights have much in common. They brilliantly 
illustrate that the judicial practice of human rights – an objectified one based 
on the available case law – amounts more to filtering the claims of individuals 
vis-à-vis the democratic state and structuring the state’s response, rather than 
injecting a novel and independent layer of normativity. I myself have found 
that the European Court of Human Rights is most judicially active – and 
protective – when the right-claims under scrutiny are particularly important to 
the democratic process56, which fits one of Follesdal’s points. I have hence 
suggested that there is a ‘single project’ – to keep using Sangiovanni’s notion 
– that helps the Court systematize its justificatory work, including the margin 
appreciation. Yet, beyond these localized findings there remains a recurring 
gap to be filled between Buchanan’s abstract notion of the ‘international legal 
human rights system’ and the technicalities of the margin of appreciation or 
the proportionality test in Europe. In that sense, the collection not only 
evidences an increasing difficulty to maintain the two legs of the human rights 
theory project – there is a clear correlation between the theorist’ inclination to 
reconstruct a given (legal) practice and the somewhat fatal finding that human 
rights extend beyond a limited domain. As far as human rights law is 
concerned, the collection also points to a difficulty to map, delimit and 
accordingly conceptualize the domain in terms that are sufficiently 
representative of the ongoing practice.  
                                                        
53 Kumm, ‘The Turn to Justification: On the Structure and Domain of Human 
Rights Practice’, 249 
54 Ibid., 242.  
55 Ibid,, 258. 
56 See Alain Zysset, The ECHR and Human Rights Theory: Reconciling the 
Moral and the Political Conceptions (London: Routledge, 2016). 
 
At least three junctures are regrettably absent from the main discussions of 
the collection. These do not involve talking about the rights’ content and 
scope yet – only about their addressee. One is the national/international 
divide noted above. The question here is whether, on a global scale, ‘legal 
practice’ refers only to the authority and effectiveness (or the lack thereof) of 
human rights law within the state (while human rights law is international in 
origin, it can be domestic in its sources – say, when a human rights 
convention takes precedence over domestic legislation in the constitution, or 
when the constitution is itself modeled upon a human rights convention). Or 
whether ‘practice’ extends to is the authority and effectiveness of international 
human rights courts and bodies. 57  Another juncture is the extra-territorial 
application of human rights law – when a state exercising authority beyond its 
territorial boundaries – and its horizontal effect – when a non-state actor may 
bear human rights duties. I believe that a systematic study of these questions 
could fill the gap identified above because they concern the principled 
boundaries of the domain independently of the rights’ content and scope. 
Human rights theorists need to unlock the junctures through legal and 
empirical relays and integrate them in their conceptual mapping.  
 
Rather than attempting to exhaustively review its contributions, this critique’s 
limited ambition was to briefly reconstruct the dispute’s initial premises, to 
track its developments since the beginning and throughout the collection, and 
then to critically engage with its inter-disciplinary dimension. The last of these 
aspects – in particular regarding law – remains in my view crucial to develop 
the field of human rights theory further. The collection does an admirable job 
with respect of the first two. And that may be what an anthology of that kind 
can realistically achieve.  
 
 
 
 
 
.  
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